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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860222-CA

v.
Category no. &

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN

3

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a convictior of possession of a
controlled substance in violation of Utah code Ann. § 58-37-8
(1953# as amended) after a trial in the Th|.rd District Court.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the a*,^^ «ader Utah Code
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1983, as amended).
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTER QN APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant was unreasonably detained in

violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
2.

Whether this Court should interpret Article I,

Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and Utih Code Ann. S 77-7-15
(1982) differently than the Federal Fourth Amendment.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUSES, AND RULES
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah (1896):
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons# houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
possessing a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (1953, as amended).
Defendant was convicted on April 1, 1987, after a bench trial in
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACT?
On November 3, 1986, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Deputy
Steve Stroud of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office observed a
vehicle with a defective tail light at about 3200 South, 900 East
(T. 5-6). Prior to stopping the vehicle, the Deputy ran a check
on the license plates to determine the name of the registered
owner (T. 6). Once stopped, he approached the driver, Sherry
Johnson, and upon request, she produced a driver's license but
stated there was no vehicle registration (T. 6). Upon
discovering that the driver was not the registered owner and that
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there was no registration in the vehicle, Deputy Stroud,
suspecting that the vehicle may have been stolen, requested
identification from defendant, the only passenger in the vehicle
(T. 6-8. 13). Defendant responded that sh^ did not have any
identification, despite the fact that she had a Utah I.D. card in
her purse (T. 7, 14). The Deputy then ask^d defendant for her
name and date of birth to which she complied (T. 7 ) •
According to the Deputy, he did not ask the defendant
to remain in the vehicle, but rather, he simply said he would "be
right back" and returned to his vehicle to run a check on the
information and fill out a traffic citatio^i (T. 7-8, 21). Police
dispatch responded that the license of the driver was suspended
and that defendant had several outstanding warrants (T. 8)•
Upon completing the citation, thp Deputy placed
defendant under arrest for the outstanding warrants (T. 8-9).
Incident to the arrest, the Deputy searched a bag in defendants
possession and discovered marijuana and various drug
paraphernalia (T. 10-11, Stated Exhibit 1).
Based upon the evidence seized, defendant was charged
with Unlawful Possession of Controlled Substance, a Third Degree
Felony, Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B
Misdemeanor and Possession of Burglary Tools, a Class B
Misdemeanor (R. 7-8). Prior to trial, defbndant moved to
suppress the evidence seized at the time of the arrest claiming
it was fruit of an unlawful seizure in violation of her State and
Federal Constitutional rights (R. 14-15).

After an evidentiary

hearing and based upon the arguments and memorandum, the trial
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court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 19) . The trial
court found that the deputy "had a legitimate reason to ask the
passenger as to her identity to determine the identity of the
driver, because the vehicle's registration was not present, and
the owner was not known, and . . • the officer was exercising a
legitimate concern in regards to the ownership of the vehicle and
to whether the vehicle may have possibly either been stolen or
being driven without possibly the owner's consent." (T. 47).
While the court noted that the evidence was unclear whether or
not there was a detention, it clearly found that the brief
detention, if any, while investigating the traffic stop, was
reasonable (T. 47-48)•
After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of
possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and
upon the State's motion, the remaining charges were dismissed (R.
94)•

Defendant was sentenced to one year in the Utah State

Prison, execution of the sentence was suspended, and defendant
was placed on probation for one year (R. 98-99)•

Defendant now

appeals.

SUMMARY Of ARGUMENT
Even assuming defendant was detained while the Deputy
prepared the traffic citation, such a detention was investigatory
and was based upon reasonable suspicion that the vehicle may have
been stolen. Balancing the minimal intrusion on defendant's
personal security against the legitimate and weighty public
interests, the detention was reasonable applying Fourth Amendment
standards.

The Deputy's brief detention of defendant as a

4-

passenger in a vehicle stopped for a minor traffic violation was
permissible and reasonable considering safety and investigatory
matters relating to the traffic stop.
Defendant failed to raise the Utah statutory argument
in the trial court and, therefore, it should not be considered on
appeal.

Any distinctions between Utah Constitutional law and

Federal search and seizure standards should be made by the Utah
Supreme Court.

To present, the Utah Supreme Court has not made

any such distinctions.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT UNREASONABLY DETAINED IN
VIOLATION OF HER FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence seized from her person incident to an
arrest for outstanding warrants.

She alleges that she was

unconstitutionally and unreasonably detained as a passenger in a
vehicle stopped for a minor traffic violation.

Defendant's claim

must fail.
The preliminary issue is whether defendant was
detained.

In its ruling on the suppression motion, the trial

court noted that the evidence was in dispute whether or not the
defendant was required to remain while the Deputy prepared the
traffic citation (T. 47). The trial court did not make a clear
finding whether or not there was a detention (T. 48).

Instead,

the court ruled that the Deputy could have properly detained
defendant for a reasonable period of time while investigating the
traffic stop (T. 48)• Likewise, this Court need not determine
-5-

whether a detention occurred, because, even assuming that
defendant's police encounter constituted a brief investigative
detention, the detention was appropriate and reasonable under
Fourth Amendment principles.
The appropriate standard for investigative detentions
was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 51
(1979); and is codified in Utah as follows:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982) . £££ also United States v.
fieCfllflSr 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v.
ttfiXXittr 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984); State v. Swanioan. 699
P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).

The reasonable suspicion standards also

applies to investigative stops involving vehicles.
v. Sharpe.

U.S.

,

United States

, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1573 (1985).

Among the governmental interests protected by the
reasonable suspicion test contained in S 77-7-15 are effective
crime prevention and detection.

Law enforcement officers must be

able, "in appropriate circumstances, and in an appropriate manner
[to] approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make
an arrest."

United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983),

quoting Terry« 392 U.S. at 22, in order to protect these
governmental interests.
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The undisputed facts in the present case are as
follows;

(1) that the Deputy made a valid traffic stop; (2) that

the driver was not the registered owner of the vehicle; and (3)
that there was no registration in the vehicle (T. 6)• As the
trial court noted, "the officer had a legitimate reason to ask
the passenger as to her identity to determine the identity of the
driver, because the vehicle's registration was not present, and
the owner was not known, and I think the officer was exercising a
legitimate concern in regards to the ownership of the vehicle and
to whether the vehicle may have possibly been either stolen or
being driven without possibly the owner's consent" (T. 47)•
Based upon the reasonable suspicion that the vehicle may have
been stolen along with the need to further investigate the
identity of the driver and her relationship to the vehicle owner,
Deputy Stroud could have reasonably required defendant to remain
seated in the stopped vehicle while he completed the
investigation and issued the citation.
The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse.
440 U.S. 648 (1979) set forth the constitutional standard to be
applied in traffic stops where the occupants are detained.
Court explained that:
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in
the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard
of "reasonableness" upon the exercise of
discretion by government officials, including
law enforcement agents, in order "'to
safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions. . .

• •" Marshall Vi Barlow's. Inc- 436 u.s. 307,
312 (1978), quoting Camflra Vt Municipal
Court. 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Thus, the
permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing
-7-

The

its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests. . . .
id., at 653-54 (citations omitted).

This Court has similarly

balanced the competing interests in detention cases.
Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987).

State v.

This Court noted as

follows:
Thus, in considering the constitutionality
of Trujillo's seizure, we must weigh the
competing and often conflicting interests
between the rights of individuals to be free
from unnecessary harassment or arbitrary
interference from law officers, and the
interest of the public in being protected
from crime. . • •
Id. (citations omitted.)

Applying the balancing test to the

instant case, one must conclude, as did the trial court, that the
brief detention, if any, was reasonable and based upon legitimate
governmental interests.
On one side of the scale, it is difficult to conceive a
less intrusive detention.

Here, the defendant was seated as

passenger in the stopped vehicle (T. 7 ) . According to the
Deputy, defendant was not asked to exit nor remain in the vehicle
(T. 21-22) . Defendant was not detained any longer than it took
to issue the traffic citation, no more than fifteen minutes (T.
8-9, 28). Realistically, it is unlikely that defendant wished
anything other than to remain comfortably seated in the vehicle
while the citation was being issued.

Under the circumstances,

the intrusion on defendant's personal security interests should
be found da fflinilBUB*
On the other side, the Deputy's investigation of
matters relating to the traffic stop promoted legitimate

governmental concerns regarding public safety and detection of
criminal activity.

Certainlyr the Deputy's approach of simply

asking defendant for identification and permitting her to remain
seated in the vehicle was the least intrusive means of pursuing
the governmental interest.

The Deputyfs conduct was neither

random or arbitrary but was based on articulable facts creating
reasonable suspicion.
Balancing the minimal intrusion on defendants security
interests against the legitimate public interest in highway
safety and crime detection, the trial court did not err in
finding that the detention of defendant was proper in pursuing
the traffic stop and stolen vehicle investigation (T. 47-48).
A further basis justifying a minimal intrusion on the
free movement of a vehicle passenger is the safety of the police
officer.

The United State Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) ruled that a police officer may order
a driver out of a vehicle during a routine traffic stop.

The

Court balanced the driver's personal liberty against the safety
of the police officer.

Regarding the latter, the Court noted

that " '[alccording to one study, approximately 30 percent of
police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a
suspect seated in an automobile.

Bristow, Police Officer

Shootings—A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. and P.S. 93

(1963) •• Adams v» Williams, 407 u.s. 143, 148 n.3 (1972)." Minima
at 110.

The Court further stated, "We think it too plain for

argument that the State's proffered justification—the safety of
the officer—is both legitimate and weighty."
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On the other side of the scale, the Court found the
intrusion on the driver's liberty to be £j£ minimus.

The driver

having already been detained by the initial traffic stop, the
issue remaining is whether the driver should remain seated in the
vehicle or along side it.

!£• at 111.

The Court concluded that

"a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against
legitimate concerns for the officers safety."

Id.

Other courts have extended the Mimms ruling to allow a
police officer to detain passengers in a routine traffic stop by
ordering the passengers out of the vehicle.

People v. Branch.

134 Misc.2d 705, 512 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Supp. 1987); People v.
Liviqni. 88 A.D.2d 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1982), afffd., 58
N.Y.2d 894, 460 N.Y.S.2d 530, 447 N.E.2d 78 (1983); People v.
David L.. 56 N.Y.2d 698, 451 N.Y.S.2d 722, 436 N.E.2d 1324
(1981), cert, denied 459 U.S. 866 (1982).

In People V, MgLavrJn,

120 A.D.2d 270, 508 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1986), the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division upheld a police officer's asking a
passenger to step out of the car as constitutional.

£&•

In

McLaurin. the police pulled over a car for speeding and asked the
passenger and driver to get out of the car.

The Officer noticed

a bulge in the passenger's jacket, searched him, found a gun, and
placed him under arrest.
ticket.

The officer never issued a speeding

The defendant argued that the gun should be suppressed

because the Officer had no reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity or that he was in danger.

Id* at 431.

Nevertheless, the McLaurin court ruled that the police
officer acted properly, thus extending the MLimma ruling to a
passenger of a car stopped for a traffic violation.

Id..

The

court noted as follows:
We fail to discern any appreciable difference
between driver and passenger in the degree of
risk posed to the safety of a police officer.
Hence, police officers are not required, as
defendant contends, to treat passengers
differently from the driver, and we reject
the argument that the circumstances which
render it permissible to order a driver out
of a car after a lawful stop for a traffic
violation are not equally applicable to a
passenger. Before a police officer orders a
passenger out of a car, he is not required to
have, separate and distinct from the
underlying traffic violation which serves as
the predicate for the stop, an articulable
basis to support a suspicion either as to the
existence of criminal activity by the
passenger or that he poses a threat to the
officer's safety.
J&.

at 433.
Applying the rational in McLaurin to the present case,

if a police officer making a routine traffic stop is permitted to
detain any passengers by ordering them to e^cit the vehicle, it
certainly follows that it is no more intrusive for a police
officer to request that the passengers remain seated during the
traffic stop.
Several legitimate governmental interests are promoted
by allowing a police officer to request that a passenger remain
seated during a routine traffic stop.
officer.

First, the safety of the

Some experts suggest that it is safer for a police

officer in a routine traffic stop to not allow the occupants to

get out of the car. Pennsylvania Vt Mimms# 434 u.s. 106, 119
n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Second, to solicit the

passengers aid in identifying the driver and owner of the vehicle
and whether the driver has the owner's permission to operate the
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vehicle.

United States v. Harris. 528 F.2d 1327f 1330 (1975).

Third, to question the passenger whether he or she is licensed to
drive in the event that the driver is unable or unlicensed to
drive the vehicle from the scene of the stop.

State v. Davis,

452 So.2d 1208f 1212 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1984).

Finally, where a

routine traffic stop is escalated into something more based upon
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, a police
officer may detain the vehicle occupants for further
investigation.

Thus, balancing the legitimate governmental

interests noted above against the minimal intrusion on
defendants personal security, the Deputy's brief investigative
detention of defendant while preparing the traffic citation was
reasonable given the circumstances.
Defendant cites United States v. Luckett. 484 F.2d 89
(1973) in support of her claim.

However, the factual background

in Luckett is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand.

In

Luckett* the police officer detained an individual to run a
warrant check after the officer had completed a jay walking
citation.

Id., at 90. Since the officer had satisfied the

purpose of the initial stop, the court found that no
justification based upon reasonable suspicion existed to continue
the detention longer that necessary to issue the citation.
at 91.

Id,

In the instant case, defendant was detained only so long

as necessary to issue the traffic citation to the driver of the
vehicle in which defendant was a passenger (T. 8-9)• Further,
the detention was based upon reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle in which the defendant was seated may have been stolen
(T. 7-8) .

POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT INTERPRET RELEVANT UTAH
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DIFFERENTLY
THAT ITS FEDERAL COUNTERPART
Defendant urges this Court to extend individual
protections outlined in Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) and
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution beyond Federal
Fourth Amendment standards. First, the State statutory argument
was not presented to the trial court, and therefore should not be
considered for the first time on appeal.
707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985).

See State v. Carter *

Second, while this court has

noted that Utah need not continue to accept the United States
Supreme Court's constantly changing interpretation of federal
search and seizure law in interpreting its own Constitution, such
a change should come from the Utah Supreme Court.

State v.

Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 103 (Utah App. 1987) (Billings, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)•

Lastly, the Utah

Supreme Court has most recently noted that it has never as yet
drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded in
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment,

gtate v. Watts. 76 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Feb. 17,

1988) .
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm
defendant's conviction below.
DATED this U^

day of March, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney Gener
DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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